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ABSTRACT 
We test the effectiveness of Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s foreign exchange interventions on conditional 
first and second moments of exchange rate returns and traded volumes, using a bivariate 
EGARCH model of the Yen/USD market from 5-13-1991 to 6-28-2002. We also estimate a 
friction model of BOJ’s intervention reaction function based on reducing short-term market 
disorderliness and supplementing domestic monetary policy. We find ineffectiveness of BOJ 
interventions pre-1995 but effectiveness post-1995, Fed intervention amplified the effectiveness 
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and BOJ interventions were vigorously used in support of domestic monetary policy objectives 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the relations between exchange rate changes, traded 
volumes and central bank interventions in the Yen/United States dollar 
(Yen/USD) foreign exchange market.  The Bank of International Settlements 
reported in 2002 that the Yen/USD was the second most traded currency pair 
(20% of all global transactions valued at USD1.21 trillion per day in 2001, 
the €-USD having 30%). Further they reported that only 13% of all 
transactions were with non-financial customers motivated by liquidity needs, 
implying that 87% occurred between foreign exchange dealers and brokers. 
What this suggests is that the huge daily volumes traded are largely driven by 
the need for resolution of asymmetric information issues amongst dealers and 
brokers, often prompted or halted by the interventions of the Bank of Japan 
(henceforth the BOJ) and the United States Federal Reserve (henceforth the 
Fed). The BOJ has been one of the most active central bank in foreign 
exchange markets in the last fifteen years. It has the distinction of having 
made perhaps the biggest ever intervention on a day—USD26 billion sales on 
April 10 1998, when all East Asian currencies were depreciating, and Japan, 
on the brink of recession, was proposing a massive fiscal expansion package. 
At the end of 2002, the BOJ had accumulated USD 452 billion of foreign 
exchange reserves, which represented almost 19% of all official reserves held 
globally, and which was 57% more than the next largest central bank, China. 
There is an extensive literature that examines the high frequency relations 
between exchange rate returns and central bank intervention—for recent 
examples, see Sarno and Taylor (2001), Kim and Sheen (2002), Kearns and 
Rigobon (2003), and Edison, Cashin and Liang (2003). This literature has 
tested the effectiveness of intervention by determining whether the level and 
volatility of exchange rate returns are affected in the desired direction, or if 
prominent trends are reduced. It has also tested for possible determinants of 
central bank responses to exchange rate returns. This literature is normally 
not concerned with low frequency issues—for example, whether or not the 
real exchange rate is under- or over-valued relative to its medium-run value, 
or whether there should be a fixed, floating or managed floating exchange 
rate regime. The focus has usually been on high frequency issues in an 
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environment where the exchange rate is market-determined. However this 
singular focus is not appropriate in the case of the BOJ, which is widely 
believed to use foreign exchange intervention as an additional instrument to 
achieve its monetary policy objectives. Therefore in this paper, we examine 
both high and low frequency issues. 
With regard to high frequency issues, the developments of financial market 
microstructural theory and testing over the last twenty years has stressed the 
relation between asset price returns and trading volumes. This suggests that 
interventions ought to matter for volumes, and volumes ought to matter for 
interventions. Intervention should affect foreign exchange trading volumes 
because changes in underlying market fundamentals—or beliefs about 
them—should cause more trading activity, as well as affecting the volatility 
of returns. Further, central banks are likely to value the information content 
of transaction volumes in making their intervention decisions. Therefore it is 
interesting and important to examine central bank interventions in the context 
of both returns and volumes. This has never been done before because data 
on volumes is not readily available. In this paper, we address this issue using 
a measure of trading volume—the daily reported trades by Tokyo foreign 
exchange brokers to the BOJ. 
On low frequency issues, there is a growing agnosticism about the ability of a 
central bank to successfully influence exchange rates. For example, Schwartz 
(2000) claims that US and European monetary authorities no longer believe 
that intervention works. She challenges the Bank of Japan for its obduracy in 
pursuing sterilized intervention 1  as an instrument targeted to domestic 
objectives. The basis for this challenge is essentially that there is no hard and 
robust evidence from around the world that interventions successfully affect 
exchange rates. However, if there is going to be good evidence of successful 
                                                 
1 The BOJ explains in a document on its website 
(www.boj.or.jp/en/about/basic/etc/faqkainy.htm) that any Yen funds to be sold on 
foreign exchange markets are raised by issuing Financing Bills. So it appears that it is 
sterilizing its interventions. However in numerous official statements, it claims that it 
aims to ensure domestic liquidity is optimal, and these interventions may be used to 
help achieve that.  
interventions, the chances are that it will be found from the BOJ’s activities 
post-1995 when it very actively intervened to stop the Yen appreciating (and 
perhaps to engineer a depreciation). Its key purpose was to prevent the 
exchange rate adding to domestic deflationary pressures.  
The main questions we address in this paper are: 
 Was the BOJ able to achieve desirable effects on the trend and volatility 
of returns and volumes with its interventions? Did it help when the Fed 
supported the BOJ in these interventions? 
 Did the BOJ use intervention as another monetary policy instrument, and 
was it successful in doing so? 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the 
theoretical relationships between exchange rates, market volumes and 
interventions, section 3 discusses the data and modelling issues, section 4 
presents the investigation results for the efficacy of the BOJ’s interventions, 
section 5 investigates the determinants of the BOJ’s interventions, and finally 
section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. TESTING THEORIES OF EXCHANGE RATE RETURNS, 
TRADING VOLUMES AND INTERVENTIONS 
 
Most of the trading volume in foreign exchange markets is driven by 
information motives, with liquidity playing a minor role. The interventions of 
central banks may also contribute to changes in the price and the quantity 
traded, and this section focuses on how interventions can interact with 
information motives to generate significant effects.  
In foreign exchange markets, asymmetric information amongst dealers 
involves both the availability of raw data for variables that may influence the 
exchange rate, as well as the distribution of beliefs about their effects and the 
future changes in those influences. The fundamental idea is that dealers with 
superior information can make profitable trades with those with inferior 
information.  
In foreign exchange markets, one source of information is produced as 
macroeconomic data. No dealer has an information advantage about 
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macroeconomic announcements. However, with regard to macroeconomic 
data, there is typically a spread of beliefs amongst dealers about the future 
evolution of these information events, as well as the importance of their 
effects. This belief asymmetry is crucial for exchange rate determination and 
is an important motivation of trading. The resulting traded volumes are not 
public knowledge, and dealers have to compete to get early access to this type 
of information.  This need to trade to build knowledge about beliefs is 
supported by the institutional feature of the market whereby dealers that post 
bid and ask prices have to accept trades (up to a limit order). As a 
consequence, inventory risk management becomes crucial, with small 
imbalances in orders seen to be translated into multiple orders among 
dealers.2 Thus small liquidity trades plus trades to build knowledge about the 
spectrum of beliefs get amplified into huge volumes. 
Another critical information event is central bank interventions in the market. 
These interventions can be “big news” on the market. The size and 
persistence of interventions can make a difference to dealers, either directly 
or perhaps because they may signal a possible change in domestic monetary 
policy. If more than one central bank is involved in the intervention, there is a 
much larger probability of a substantial effect on dealers’ portfolios. 
Whenever the central bank intervenes, all dealers do not necessarily know 
that it has occurred.3  So once again this information vacuum can only be 
filled by frequent and intelligent trading. The challenge for any trader is to 
build knowledge about the spectrum of market beliefs and interventions, 
ahead of other traders, so that they might avoid making losses from being 
poorly informed, and even possibly make profits from being better informed. 
With beliefs able to change rapidly, information about the belief spectrum 
                                                 
2 This is known as the ‘hot potato’ syndrome (for example, see Lyons (2001)). It 
occurs when dealers sequentially unload unwanted positions, until eventually a 
satisfied counterparty is found. 
3 In a survey of 13 OECD central banks, Lecourt and Raymond (2003) report that 
80% of central banks prefer to deal with major banks, thus ensuring high liquidity 
and visibility. Sometimes they do trade with brokers, to maintain their anonymity, if 
their interventions might be interpreted as inconsistent with current monetary policy 
and thus falsely signal a change. 
will become quickly out-dated. Therefore these information-motivated trades 
need to continue at a high frequency. It is not surprising, then, that foreign 
exchange markets have the highest turnover of all markets in the world.  
How does trading resolve the information problem on beliefs? In their 
individual deals, traders can observe the responses to their own bid and ask 
prices, and can observe how much others are prepared to trade at the bid and 
ask prices they set, and how readily they change those prices. Thus 
transaction volume and price data are vital for building intelligence on the 
distribution of beliefs in the foreign exchange market place. Naturally, it 
makes a difference if changes in transaction volumes arise from other private 
dealers or from the central bank. The central bank’s motives differ from those 
of other dealers. 
Initially, volume information played no role in the micro-structural literature 
on financial markets. Only price signals mattered (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom 
1985). Subsequently volume signals were introduced, which explained how 
price and volume information can together improve the learning process. 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) showed that informed traders would want to trade 
large quantities if they knew they had superior information, and so the 
observed volume of trade becomes a good signal of the possible existence of 
an informed trader. In the context of the foreign exchange market, an 
‘informed’ trader becomes one that is a substantial step ahead in determining 
the key features of the distribution of information and beliefs in the 
marketplace. Naturally, every trader is receiving different private signals 
from their trades. The quality of the signals received will differ, and so in 
subsequent trades, the volume traded by a trader reveals to others some 
information about the quality of prior signals received. The greater the 
volume, the higher the inferred quality. This was the argument suggested by 
Blume, Easley and O’Hara (1994). However when central bank intervention 
is the reason for observed trading, it does not necessarily follow that volumes 
traded will increase—the central bank may be intervening specifically to 
calm the market. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggested another possible reason for trading 
volumes to be informative—transaction costs (which are surely very low in 
the Yen/USD foreign exchange market). Liquidity-motivated traders, usually 
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large financial institutions acting on behalf of their private clients, will 
typically prefer to execute their requirements when the market is very active, 
thus economizing on transaction costs. In the same way, information-
motivated traders will also prefer active times. This implies an equilibrium in 
which information acquisition is more intense when the market is active. 
Therefore high volumes are associated with greater learning.  
The empirical literature has documented the existence of a strong positive 
correlation between trade volumes and the volatility of returns. The ‘mixture 
of distribution hypothesis’ (MDH) developed by Clark (1973) and then Epps 
and Epps (1976) suggests the existence of underlying latent (information) 
variables that lead to an observed joint dependence of volumes and returns.  
New information will affect both unpredictable volumes and the volatility of 
returns. This latent information may include ‘secret’ central bank intervention, 
which will affect both volumes and returns. 
Results from tests involving the joint distribution of returns and volume in the 
foreign exchange market have been few and varied4. Glassman (1987) and 
Bessembinder (1994) used volumes on foreign exchange futures from the 
Chicago International Money Market as a proxy for spot volumes. They do 
not find significant effects from their derivative volume variable when trying 
to explain bid-ask spreads. Hartmann (1999) uses the volume data that we use 
in this paper—the reported volume transactions of Japanese foreign exchange 
brokers to the BOJ. He finds that unpredictable volumes do have a significant 
positive impact on bid-ask spreads in the Yen/USD market. He also shows 
that the volume data exhibits significant conditional heteroscedasticity.  
                                                 
4 The evidence from tests of the mixture of distributions hypothesis using stock 
market data also varies. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) showed that volume had a 
significant positive effect on the conditional variance of returns. Hiemstra and Jones 
(1994) in an EGARCH context do not find support for the hypothesis. On the other 
hand, Andersen (1996) does find support for MDH with a model of stochastic 
volatility. He also finds that the estimate of the volatility persistence of returns is 
significantly lowered when volume data is included. He conjectures that this could be 
because there are some information events that induce heavy trading, but with little 
effect on daily returns. 
These Hartmann (1999) results suggest that a GARCH model for volumes 
might be appropriate, and that unpredictable volumes are likely to have an 
impact on the exchange rate returns process. It is now well-established that 
the exchange rate returns are efficiently modelled as an EGARCH(1,1) 
process using a Student-t distribution (for example, see Hsieh 1989, Baillie 
and Bollerslev 1989, and Kim and Sheen 2002). The ‘mixture of 
distributions’ hypothesis suggest that a way to proceed is to set up a bivariate 
EGARCH model for exchange rate returns and volumes. We can test whether 
unpredictable volumes have an impact on the conditional means and 
variances of the returns process, and whether unexpected returns have an 
impact on the conditional means and variances of the volume process. In this 
context, it is also possible to test whether foreign exchange interventions by 
the central bank have any impact on that bivariate process.   
The empirical literature that tests for the effectiveness of central bank 
intervention is plagued by the problem of simultaneity. If the exchange rate is 
thought to be depreciating excessively on a day, the central bank may choose 
to begin to sell foreign currency that day. It will continue its operations 
through the day if it perceives that it has slowed the exchange rate trend, or 
better still if it reverses it. But reversal is not a necessary condition of 
effectiveness, and so it is likely that there will be many days of intervention 
sales (purchases) of foreign currency when the exchange rate has actually 
depreciated on the day. What we need to know is whether the exchange rate 
would have depreciated more without the intervention. This problem will 
apply equally when we are testing whether intervention has a stabilizing 
effect on trade volumes. So far there have been three approaches to resolving 
this problem. The first simply assumes that intervention affects the exchange 
rate with a lag, which is unsatisfactory because interventions happen in real 
time (for example, see Baillie and Osterberg (1995) and Lewis (1995)). In a 
second approach, Kim and Sheen (2002) introduce dummy variables for 
cumulative, large-sized and coordinated interventions to see whether the 
isolation of these unusual interventions can overcome the downward bias 
induced by simultaneity.  In a third approach, Kearns and Rigobon (2003) use 
simulated GMM estimates, making an identifying assumption that the central 
bank intervention policy has an exogenous structural shift within the sample. 
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The last two of these approaches have provided evidence indicating that 
interventions have been stabilizing. In this paper, we take the second 
approach and extend it to a bivariate model of exchange returns and volumes. 
Since the BOJ significantly raised the intensity of its interventions after mid-
1995, it is quite possible that the simultaneity problem will be overwhelmed, 
and that we might obtain transparent evidence of the desirable effectiveness 
of intervention. 
When central banks intervene infrequently, their primary objective is usually 
to eliminate any perceived disorderliness in the foreign exchange market. In 
the previous literature, this disorderliness has been framed in terms of 
exchange rate realizations—the correction of an undesired trend, the 
reduction of abnormally high volatility of returns, the pricking of a bubble, or 
perhaps the moderation of an excessive overshoot.5 
However the significant developments from microstructural theories of 
financial markets have alerted analysts to the importance of volume measures. 
It would therefore seem sensible for a central bank to extend its measure of 
disorderliness by also using information on traded volumes. Thus we suggest 
that a central bank might want to intervene if volumes are unexpectedly high, 
or if the volatility of those trade volumes were felt to be excessively large. 
Even if indicators on exchange rate returns are not yet suggesting a disorderly 
market, unusual volume outcomes may be a useful early predictor of future 
disorderliness. If apparently excessive exchange rate changes are occurring 
without any unusual volume effects, then the central bank ought to doubt its 
judgement that these exchange rate changes are undesirable. If both returns 
and volume indicators are giving unusual signals, the central bank should be 
more convinced that an intervention is appropriate.  
Since trading volumes are likely to be very informative for the intervention 
decision of the central bank, it needs to be able to obtain this information. 
The central bank, like any other dealer in the market, needs to participate in 
                                                 
5 There is a large literature studying the determinants of intervention. For example, 
see Dominguez and Frankel (1993), Lewis (1995), Almekinders and Eijffinger 
(1996), Dominguez (1998), Baillie and Osterberg (1998), Kim and Sheen (2002), and 
Kearns and Rigobon (2003). 
the market to get this information. Therefore it should not be surprising if 
there are many days when the central bank is in the market, but not having 
any apparent or expected effect. By these innocuous trades, it is able to gather 
information about the market. However some central banks also gather 
information by requiring reports of broking or dealing activities of 
institutions under their supervision. For example, the BOJ requires brokers to 
provide a daily report of their actual trades (in volumes and prices) and this is 
the source of our volume data. This is an incomplete source of volumes since 
it only accounts for onshore and brokered transactions. Nevertheless it is 
apparently useful to the BOJ, and it is important to test whether it plays a 
significant role in their intervention activity. 
Market disorderliness, whether manifested through exchange rate or traded 
volume measures, is not necessarily the only motivating factor for 
interventions. As explained in the introduction, foreign exchange intervention 
can be and often is used to help achieve domestic monetary policy objectives. 
When short-term interest rates are changed, a central bank may decide to 
intervene in foreign exchange markets in support of this change in its 
principal monetary policy instrument. In the case of the BOJ, both 
motivations6 are likely to be important.  
 
3.   DATA AND MODELING ISSUES 
 
The Yen/USD exchange rate is the mid-point rate collected at 5pm London 
time (GMT) and the volume data is the volume of spot market transactions in 
Tokyo foreign exchange market as reported by brokers to the BOJ and 
measured in billions of Yen. These data were collected from Datastream. We 
chose the London market closing rate for the exchange rate so that not only 
the BOJ interventions but also the US Fed interventions are relevant when 
calculating daily returns. Figure 1 shows the time-line of market operating 
hours for both the Tokyo and the New York foreign exchange markets. The 
Tokyo market opens and closes before the New York market, and any Yen 
                                                 
6 There are other minor determinants such as profitability and the replenishing and 
rebalancing of central bank foreign exchange inventories.  
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interventions by the BOJ and the US Fed on calendar date t would be 
completed by noon New York time (which is 5pm GMT)7. Daily exchange 
rate return calculated over the horizon between GMT 5pm at date t-1 and date 
t would thus include both the BOJ and the Fed intervention on the Yen/USD 
exchange rate at date t. The daily exchange rate returns are measured as 
continuously compounding returns, 1ln( / ) 100t t tR S S −= × , where St is the spot 
exchange rate between the US dollar and the Japanese Yen (Yen/USD) 
measured as units of Yen per US Dollar.  
Trading volume used is the spot market broker volume measured in USD 
millions in the Tokyo market. This data has to be reported to the BOJ by 
brokers every day between opening time and 3:30pm JST. As Hartmann 
(1999) notes, it is very difficult to get foreign exchange turnover data series. 
This broker volume data is informative as an indicator of overall spot 
volumes in Japan if the broker share of the market remains constant or grows. 
In fact the Bank of International Settlements (2002) reported that the 
proportion of brokered transactions has been increasing globally because of 
the advent of low-cost electronic broking. A further issue is that brokered 
trades tend to be used for larger transactions because of the greater need for 
anonymity. Again the increased use of electronic broking has reduced this 
potential size bias. The trading volume series contain significant but small 
positive (linear and non-linear) trends, and so the residuals from a quadratic-
detrending regression are used as the detrended (and de-meaned) volume, 
VMt.8  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of exchange rate return and daily 
volume. It is evident that both daily returns and daily volumes are non-
normal and leptokurtic. Negative skewness is observed for the exchange rate 
returns while volumes are positively skewed. Significant linear and non-
linear serial correlations are observed in both cases, and bivariate correlations 
between the two are also significant. Tests of Granger causalities reveal more 
                                                 
7 See Bank of Japan (2000) 
8 We have replicated our regressions using the logarithm of volume. We find that our 
parameter estimates are qualitatively similar, though the equation diagnostics 
deteriorate when using the logarithm. 
details on the nature of this bivariate relationship. The causality runs only 
from volume to returns, but there is a bi-directional causality between volume 
and squared returns, which is consistent with the mixture of distributions 
hypothesis. Thus, modeling of the daily exchange rate returns and trading 
volume must account for these observed characteristics.  
The intervention data cover the period 13 May 1991 to 28 June 2002 
containing 213 BOJ interventions in the Yen/USD market. The Yen 
interventions by the BOJ is normally carried out in the Tokyo market, 
however, if the BOJ feels further intervention is required after the close of 
business in Tokyo at 5pm JST, it would request other central banks to 
conduct interventions on its behalf. The US Fed has been performing this role 
and there were 22 such intervention activities in the Yen/USD exchange rate 
in the New York market by the Fed during the sample.  
The BOJ’s and the Fed’s intervention in the Yen market are publicly 
available9 and they are recorded as net market purchase of US dollar assets in 
billions of Yen. The full sample can be split into two sub-samples to account 
for the two distinct periods of BOJ interventions. The emergence of Dr. 
Sakakibara (better known as ‘Mr. Yen’ in the Western markets) as the new 
Director of International Finance Bureau at the Ministry of Finance and 
Economics in 1995 marked a new era of interventions where interventions 
were less frequent but substantially larger in size. In order to account for this 
structural break we split the sample on the 20 June 1995 (see Ito 2002).  
Table 2 reports the intervention statistics for the full and the two sub-samples. 
For the full sample, there were 213 interventions (180 positives and 33 
negatives) by the BOJ and most of the interventions were positive, that is, 
intervention purchases of USD (sales of Yen) assets. The widely-held belief 
is that the BOJ was mostly attempting to reduce the level of excess demand 
for the Yen in the market by these interventions. The average size of the 
intervention is Yen 149.9 billion and it ranges from as low as Yen 5.1 (3.2) to 
1405.9 (2620.1) billion for intervention purchases (sales) of the USD for Yen. 
                                                 
9 The BOJ data are available at www.mof.go.jp/english/e1c021.htm. The Fed data is 
available from www.newyorkfed.org/pihome/news/forex/. The intervention statistics 
are released 30 days after the end of each financial quarter. 
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Interventions were often followed by reinforcing interventions in the same 
direction. Given that there was a BOJ intervention, the probability of another 
intervention in the same direction the following day is 53%. The probability 
of a three successive interventions is 34%. Most of the interventions were 
concentrated in sub-sample one, accounting for 166 out of 213 days. 
However, the size of transactions increased drastically, with the average Yen 
sale (purchase) increasing from Yen 50.2 (29.2) to 488 (684.4) billion in sub-
sample two. The US Fed interventions were modest in size compared to the 
BOJ transactions, and were designed to support BOJ transactions initiated in 
the Tokyo market shortly before the New York market opening, as shown by 
the probability of the Fed intervention being coordinated with a prior BOJ 
intervention being one. As with BOJ activities, the Fed interventions were 
concentrated in the first sub-sample (18 out of total of 22 transactions). 
 
4. MODELING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOJ INTERVENTION 
 
The time-varying volatility and the leptokurtosis of the distributions of the 
daily exchange rate returns and volumes may be effectively modelled by a 
suitably specified GARCH model with a non-normal conditional density for 
the residuals. The asymmetric effects, if any, of unexpected changes can be 
handled by applying Nelson (1991)’s Exponential-GARCH approach that 
explicitly models the effects of positive and negative innovations separately. 
EGARCH models also have the advantage of not having to impose positivity 
restrictions on the coefficients in the conditional variance equation. Indeed, 
negative coefficients for included exogenous variables (such as the 
intervention variable) will have a special meaning in this paper. The 
significant linear and non-linear correlations between the daily returns of 
Yen/USD exchange rate and the spot market trade volume can be jointly 
modelled by a bivariate EGARCH model of the two variables with a bivariate 
t distribution for the residuals used to account for the excess kurtosis shown 
in the data. To simplify the analysis and economise on the number of 
parameters to be estimated, the conditional correlations are assumed to be 
constant through time (see Bollerslev 1990).  
The bi-directional causations between the exchange rate returns and trade 
volume documented in Table 1 are modelled by including feedback effects in 
the conditional mean and variance equations. These include lagged error 
terms (own and the other) included in both the conditional mean and variance 
equations, and contemporaneous variances (own and the other) in the 
conditional mean equations.  
In addition, a holiday dummy is included to account for possible seasonal 
effects on the conditional mean and variance of the daily returns and volume. 
These may be due to significant differences in the volume of information 
relevant for trading on particular days, leading to consistently different 
patterns in the conditional mean and variance movements. The holiday 
dummy takes as values the number of days between two successive trading 
days. It is one for week days, three for Mondays and one or more for days 
immediately following public holidays. 
The effectiveness of the interventions are examined by including daily 
intervention variables in the conditional mean and variance of the bivariate 
EGARCH model and examining the sign and the significance of the 
intervention variables. The effectiveness of the daily intervention on the 
exchange rate may be dependent on a number of features, however. 
First, the response of the foreign exchange market may depend on whether 
the intervention on the day is large enough to have a significant effect on the 
current trend. The size of the intervention matters. Given the relatively large 
turnover in the Japanese foreign exchange market—the BIS (2002) reports a 
daily average of 147 billion in USD equivalents in April 2001, out of which 
101 billion were accounted for by Yen/USD transactions—the size of 
intervention has to be substantial enough to be able to move the ‘equilibrium’ 
exchange rate. Second, it is important to determine whether the intervention 
transaction for the day is a one-off episode, or a part of a series of 
interventions over many days. The BOJ may spread out the intervention 
transactions over a number of days to maximize its effects through the 
signaling channel. An intervention stance may be perceived to be more 
credible to market participants if they see a series of intervention transactions 
in the same direction rather than a one-off entry into the market. The market 
perception of the different effects of intervention is modeled in this paper by 
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allowing the intervention coefficient to differ depending on the features of the 
intervention on the day. This is accomplished by incorporating two slope 
dummy variables into the coefficient for the intervention variable in the 
conditional mean and variance equations. These are: a size dummy that takes 
the value of one for interventions of larger in amount than the average daily 
intervention for each of the three samples (Yen 149.6, 46.8 and 513 billion in 
the full sample, and the first and second sub-sample, respectively) and zero 
otherwise; and a cumulative intervention dummy that takes the value of one 
for days of intervention that are preceded by at least two previous days’ 
intervention in the same direction and zero otherwise.  
In addition to the intervention carried out by the BOJ, the US Fed also 
intervened in the Yen/USD market. However, without exception, the Fed 
interventions were carried out in the morning (New York) after the overnight 
BOJ interventions, and always in the same direction. It is fair to say, therefore, 
that the Fed’s interventions were an extension of that by the BOJ and were 
designed to reinforce the effectiveness of the BOJ interventions. We model 
this separately from the BOJ interventions.  
  9
The bivariate EGARCH(1,1) model to be tested is as shown below: 
Conditional Mean Equations 
1 1 , t , t ,
int         ( )
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Conditional Variance Equations 
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Dhol,t = Seasonal dummy that takes the number of days between two successive 
observations. 1 for normal weekdays, 3 for Mondays and 2 or higher for days 
immediately following market closures due to holidays. 
Idifft = Interest rate differential between US and Japanese overnight interest rates.  
Intvt = Net market purchase of USD assets with Yen by the BOJ, in 100 billions of Yen 
IntvFEDt = Net market purchase of USD assets with Yen by the FED, in 100 billions of Yen 
ICUMt = Cumulative BOJ intervention dummy variable that takes the value of one if BOJ 
intervention at day t is preceded by intervention in the same direction at day t-1 
and t-2, and zero otherwise. 
ISIZEt = BOJ intervention size dummy variable that takes the value of one if the absolute 
amount of intervention at day t is greater than the sample average daily net market 
purchase of Yen (149.65, 46.75 and 513.05 billion for the full sample, sub-sample 
one and sub-sample two, respectively) and zero otherwise. 
her,t = Conditional variance of daily exchange rate changes. 
hvm,t = Conditional variance of daily detrended trading volume in the Tokyo FX market. 
 
For the joint distribution of the two error processes, a conditional bivariate standardized t 
distribution with variance-covariance matrix Ht and d degrees of freedom is used instead 
of the customary bivariate normal, thus accounting for possible leptokurtosis in the joint 
conditional densities (see Bollerslev 1987; Hamilton 1994). The virtue of using this 
distribution is that the unconditional leptokurtosis observed in most high frequency asset 
price data sets can show up as conditional leptokurtosis, and yet have the important 
property that it converges asymptotically to the Normal distribution as d approaches 
infinity (or alternatively, 1/d is statistically indistinguishably from zero)10, which appears 
to be appropriate with low frequency data. The t conditional density is as below (k=2 for 
the bivariate case):  
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10 d is the degree of freedom parameter in the student-t distribution and it is negatively related to the fourth 
moment of the distribution. 
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4.1 Empirical Results 
The maximum likelihood estimations of the bivariate EGARCH models for 
both the daily Yen/USD exchange rate returns and the Tokyo foreign 
exchange market trade volume are reported in Table 3. Full-sample and two 
sub-sample estimation results are shown. The effects of the Yen 
interventions carried out by the BOJ and the Fed are investigated by 
examining the sign and the magnitude of the coefficients of the intervention 
variables included in the conditional mean and variance equations.  
 
Full-Sample 
The contemporaneous effect of intervention on the return is picked up by aintv. 
For effectiveness of intervention, a positive sign is expected as this would 
imply net market purchases of USD with Yen would lead to a USD 
appreciation (or a Yen depreciation). The estimated contemporaneous 
intervention effect (-0.3674), however, is negative and significant. This 
suggests a USD depreciation against the Yen was associated with an 
intervention purchase of USD assets. This is in line with other researchers 
who report similar contemporaneous results (for example, see Baillie and 
Osterberg 1997, Dominguez 1998, Kim, Kortian and Sheen 2000). Although 
it is tempting to conclude against the effectiveness of central bank 
interventions, as some have, this result is affected by the well-known 
simultaneity between exchange rate movements and intervention activities. 
The identification problem is not easy to resolve because it is hard to think of 
good instruments for intervention.  
One approach to the problem is to introduce dummy variables to test 
whether cumulative or particularly large interventions have distinct effects 
on returns. The coefficient for a cumulative intervention dummy, acum, that 
picks up the effects of interventions that continued for at least three days, is 
smaller in magnitude than the contemporaneous coefficient but also negative 
in sign (-0.0911). Thus, it adds to the simultaneity problem of interventions 
on exchange rate movements. Large interventions, however, had an 
offsetting effect as shown by the positive and significant coefficient, asize 
(0.4263). The magnitude of the size dummy coefficient is larger than that of 
the contemporaneous coefficient, suggesting that on the days of large 
interventions the overall effect of large interventions was positive—the 
purchase (sale) of each Yen 100 billion  led to a 0.03% Yen appreciation 
(depreciation), provided the intervention exceeded Yen 150 billion . This 
suggests that interventions were effective on these days in moving the 
Yen/USD rate in the desired direction.  
As for the Yen interventions carried out by the US Fed, they had the 
effect of reinforcing the positive effect on the exchange rate of the above-
average purchase interventions of the BOJ. The coefficient, afed, is 
significantly positive and nearly three times the size of the coefficients for 
the contemporaneous and the size dummy effects. Thus, those BOJ 
interventions that were followed by Fed interventions had the desired effect 
of moving the exchange rate in the right direction. This suggests that markets 
give credibility to interventions, particularly when they are large and involve 
two of the world’s biggest central banks. 
Intervention also has a significant effect on the conditional variance 
of exchange rate returns. Although the contemporaneous effect, bintv, on this 
volatility measure is positive, once again this could be due to the 
simultaneity problem. That is, the observed association of higher volatility 
with interventions may be because those interventions were prompted by 
high exchange rate volatilities. Applying our dummy technique, we find the 
cumulative intervention effect is insignificant, while the size effect and the 
Fed intervention effect are significant and negative. The parameter estimates 
imply that, although normal interventions were associated with higher 
conditional volatility of exchange rate returns, this contemporaneous effect 
was nearly offset on the days of larger interventions. If the BOJ interventions 
were followed by Fed interventions, a significant drop in the conditional 
volatility is observed.  
The effects of the interventions on trade volumes, αintv, are shown to 
be similar to the exchange rate volatility effect. That is, the contemporaneous 
effect is positive, but the other dummy intervention coefficients are negative. 
The effect of a normal intervention was to raise the trading volume, however, 
if interventions were large and continued on a number of days, a slight fall in 
the volume occurred. The Fed intervention also added to this offsetting 
influence. This is similar to the volatility effects reported above. Lower 
volumes (and volatility of volumes) on those unusual intervention days 
indicate a successful calming operation by the central bank.  
The feedback variables in the conditional mean equations are all 
significant except for the effect of the lagged error of volume on exchange 
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rate returns. However, the responses of conditional variances to lagged errors 
(own and the other variable’s) are generally insignificant. It is widely 
believed that volumes and the returns volatility are positively correlated. 
However our EGARCH results indicate that unexpected volumes have an 
asymmetric effect on the conditional variance of returns. If volumes are 
unexpectedly low, then the conditional variance is significantly lower. 
However, unexpectedly high volumes do not lead to higher conditional 
variance when that volume is very high. 
The holiday effect is strongly present in all cases. In general, the Yen 
depreciated and the volatility was higher on the trading days following a 
market closure. Interestingly, both the first and second moments of detrended 
volume were significantly lower on these days. Finally, the effect of the 
interest rate differential is positive and significant as expected—a higher 
interest rate differential in favour of the US led to a USD appreciation on the 
day. 
Sub-Sample One 
The first sub-sample was a period of frequent and small interventions. The 
contemporaneous effect on exchange rate returns is still negative and 
significant. While cumulative intervention is now positive and significant, it 
is insufficient to outweigh the contemporaneous effect. The size dummy is 
now not significant, suggesting that BOJ activity did not reach critical size in 
this sub-sample. However those BOJ interventions that were followed by the 
US Fed interventions in the same direction produced the desired effect (a 
Yen appreciation (depreciation) from an intervention purchase (sale) of Yen). 
Once again, coordinated interventions are seen to achieve the goal of 
affecting Yen movements in the desired direction.  
The volatility-increasing effect of contemporaneous interventions on 
returns is still observed, as is the volatility dampening effect of cumulative 
interventions. Interestingly, the Fed intervention failed to have any influence 
on the volatility of returns. Thus, only the unilateral interventions, if carried 
out over a number of days, had the desired volatility-reducing influence, but 
on the whole, both unilateral and coordinated interventions were associated 
with a rise in the conditional variance of the Yen/USD returns.  
The effects of intervention on the first and second moments of the 
detrended trade volume are similar to those observed for the full sample. 
That is, contemporaneous rises in the volume and the volatility of volume 
were offset by the cumulative and large interventions. The Fed intervention 
effect is significant only in the volume volatility. The asymmetric effects of 
unexpected volume on the conditional variance of returns remain. 
 
Sub-Sample Two 
The second sub-sample represents a shift in the BOJ’s intervention 
philosophy. Interventions became less frequent but significantly larger in 
magnitudes, and therefore had the potential for a more enhanced signalling 
effect. The contemporaneous effect of the intervention on exchange rate 
returns is now positive and significant. This is somewhat unexpected 
considering the full and the first sub-sample estimations exhibited the 
opposite results11. In addition, the size dummy is significant and negative, 
indicating that the contemporaneously positive impact on intervention is 
offset on the days of above average interventions. The effects of the Fed 
intervention are still positive. The overall effects of intervention are thus 
positive for both unilateral and coordinated interventions. These results 
suggest that the BOJ’s normal intervention activities had reached critical size, 
but excessively large interventions now became counter-productive. 
On the conditional volatility of returns, BOJ interventions failed to 
elicit any volatility response. However, the US Fed intervention again had a 
market calming effect, and so on the days of coordinated interventions, the 
conditional volatilities fell significantly in response to the intervention.  
As for the intervention effects on trade volume, both the 
contemporaneous BOJ and Fed effects are significantly present in both the 
conditional mean and variance equations, while the Fed effect is also 
significant in the conditional variance of the trade volume. In short, the 
intervention activities raised the volume and volume volatility. Finally we 
still observe a significant asymmetric effect of unexpected volume on returns 
volatility. 
 
5. REACTION FUNCTIONS OF THE BOJ 
 
In this section we examine the possible determinants of the BOJ 
interventions. An optimal intervention rule follows from the minimization of 
                                                 
11 However, similar results are reported by Ito (2002). 
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a central bank loss function subject to the constraints in equations (1) - (3) 
and perhaps a constraint on profitability of the central bank. The loss 
function is assumed to be linear-quadratic in expected deviations and the 
variance of the exchange rate from a moving target and of deviations of 
traded volume from its expected value.12 In general, the optimal intervention 
rule will depend on features of the exchange rate and trade volume processes, 
and perhaps on profitability. 
A central bank intervenes if it believes it can reduce short-term 
market disorderliness and if it regards intervention as a monetary policy 
instrument. Therefore the moving exchange rate target, in the loss function 
needs to be a weighted average of a short-term trend (or moving average) 
and a lower frequency target driven by the objectives of monetary policy.   
With regard to minimizing short-term disorderliness in the foreign 
exchange markets for its currency, a central bank might intervene for a 
number of inter-related reasons—perceived trend correction, volatility 
smoothing, unexpected high traded volumes, and excessive exchange rate 
overshooting. Firstly, the central bank might wish to reduce disorderliness by 
returning the exchange rate to what it perceives to be the appropriate short-
term trend. The aim would be to moderate any high frequency speculative 
bubbles or bandwagon surges. This requires the central bank to be convinced 
that it knows the underlying trend. This high frequency activity can be 
associated with the widely used term, ‘leaning against the wind’. However if 
the ‘wind’ blows too fiercely, we might expect the central bank to recognize 
that its intervention may be futile.  
Disorderliness may show up as excessive fluctuations in exchange 
rates through higher volatility or through unexpectedly high traded volumes 
that arise in periods of greater uncertainty. The central bank may intervene to 
calm the market, by trying to reduce the uncertainty. Again, we might expect 
that there is a threshold of disorderliness beyond which a central bank would 
back away from the market. In these circumstances, the volatility and trading 
volumes may be sufficiently large to swamp any attempts by the central bank 
to calm the market. In these circumstances, their interventions would be 
ineffective, and would be likely to inflict serious losses on the central bank. 
                                                 
12 Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) explain the steps for solving for an intervention 
rule, but without volume effects. 
We test to see whether derived measures of conditional volatility of the spot 
exchange rate changes and unexpected traded volumes have this non-linear 
influence on intervention. 
Even if the central bank acts from time to time to reduce 
disorderliness, it may choose to use intervention as an additional instrument 
to achieve domestic monetary policy objectives. This manifests from our 
assumption that a component of the moving exchange rate target in the loss 
function is associated with monetary policy objectives. Since we cannot 
identify this component, we model it in our intervention function by 
including daily changes of the US and Japanese overnight interest rates, 
which are the major instruments of monetary policy. However these 
measures may also pick up the possibility that the central bank reacts to curb 
excessive over-shooting in the exchange rate brought on by changes in the 
interest rate differential. 
In addition to the trend correction and volatility/volume reducing 
motives, cumulated profits/losses generated as a result of continued 
intervention activities may act as a constraint (or an incentive) for continued 
loss-making interventions. Thus, an appropriately defined cumulative 
profit/loss measure may prove to be important in modelling the BOJ 
intervention activities.  
 
5.1 Measurement and the Effects of Short-term Trend Deviations 
Central banks do appear to undertake ‘leaning against the wind’ interventions, 
whenever current exchange rate movements deviate significantly from a 
short-term trend. This trend might be modelled as a moving average. 
Following LeBaron (1999), who justifies his choice of 150 days as being 
commonly used by market traders, we use a 150 day window. The short-term 
trend deviation, ERDEVt, becomes the difference between the current 
Yen/USD exchange rate (ERt) and its 150 day moving average as below: 
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1
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The time series plot of ERDEVt is shown in Figure 3 (Panel A). We expect 
that a positive deviation (or a depreciation of the Yen relative to the trend) 
would lead to a negative intervention (purchase of Yen) by the BOJ to try 
and correct the movement away from the short-term trend. We would expect 
the estimated parameter of the effect of trend deviations to be negative. 
Furthermore, the BOJ may be expected to engage more intensively (or 
perhaps less, if size has an overwhelming effect on the central bank) if 
deviations are sizeable.  
 
5.2 Measurement and the Effects of Conditional Volatility 
We generate a series for conditional volatility (ht) from the bivariate 
EGARCH model discussed above, and use it in subsequent estimations as a 
possible determinant of intervention behavior (see Panel B of Figure 3). If 
the Yen is depreciating on a particular day, and the measure for the volatility 
of returns rises, we expect the central bank to attempt to calm the market by 
purchasing Yen. Conversely on days of a strengthening Yen, it will sell Yen 
to calm the market. Therefore we expect the estimated parameter for the 
effect of volatility to be negative. Once again, we admit the possibility of 
above-normal size effects on the central bank’s response. 
5.3 Measurement and the Effects of Unexpected Volume 
Detrended volume is also potentially useful for modeling the intervention 
behaviour of a central bank. Volume movements may have enough 
information content for a central bank to initiate or moderate intervention 
activities. In line with the mixed distributions hypothesis (discussed in the 
introduction), a distinction would be made between expected and unexpected 
volume changes. A central bank would not activate or modify its intervention 
activities in response to expected volume changes. Only unexpected changes 
in volume would gain the attention of the central bank. We further conjecture 
that only positive unexpected changes would matter. Negative changes, 
which represent days when volumes are unexpectedly low, would be of little 
concern to the central bank. Therefore we use the estimated positive residuals, 

tε +  from the E-GARCH regressions of (1)-(3) as our measure of unexpected 
volume, UnexpVMt. If this measure goes up, and the Yen is depreciating, the 
central bank will be particularly concerned about the rapid selling off of the 
Yen, and so it will reduce its Yen sales. If the Yen is appreciating on a day of 
unexpected high volume, Yen sales will be increased. Therefore we expect 
the estimated parameter of the effect of unexpected volume to be negative. 
Again abnormal size effects may matter. 
 
5.4 Measurement and the Effects of Interest Rate Changes 
Interest rate changes are daily change in overnight interest rates of the US 
and Japan. These overnight rates are proxies for monetary policies in each 
country—changes in these rates signal adjustments in the monetary policy 
stance. They are shown in panel C and D of Figure 3, respectively. Consider 
two arguments why interest rates may matter.  
The first is that the interest rate differential may lead to overshooting 
exchange rates, which may be excessive if there are perceived to be band-
wagon effects. This would suggest that the estimated coefficient of the 
Japanese interest rate on intervention would be positive (and negative for the 
US interest rate).  
The second argument is that foreign exchange intervention may 
operate as a support for domestic monetary policy. In the first sub-sample, 
short-term interest rates in Japan and the US fell together until mid-1993, but 
for the next two years, they changed little in Japan (having reached 2%) but 
rose substantially in the US to reduce inflationary pressures. Throughout this 
sub-period, the appreciating Yen created a problem for the Japanese 
economy that had already begun (in 1992) its protracted slump in output 
growth. In the latter part of the first sub-period, the BOJ began to buy USD 
assets rather than reduce its interest rate, and so there was a positive 
correlation between its intervention and the rising US interest rates.  For 
Japan in the second sub-sample, the overnight interest rate gradually 
approached zero, suggesting a liquidity trap. Therefore we conjecture that 
foreign exchange intervention became an increasingly viable alternative to 
domestic open-market operations for achieving the objectives of monetary 
policy. As the Japanese interest rate fell towards the zero bound, Yen sales 
for USD by the central bank were likely to have increased to weaken the 
exchange rate to help stimulate the slumping Japanese economy. Thus this 
argument leads us to expect the estimated parameter on the Japanese interest 
rate to be negative, in the second sub-sample  
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5.5 Measurement and the Effects of the Profitability of Intervention 
In general, central banks do not disclose full information on their portfolio of 
international reserve assets and liabilities. It is therefore difficult for 
outsiders to properly assess the profitability of their operations. However the 
trend towards disclosing the size of their daily interventions on foreign 
exchange markets has made it possible to get some perspective on the issue.  
We measure the conditional profit of all past interventions, starting at an 
arbitrary point (which we choose as the beginning of the sample), by 
computing the current net value of every past intervention and summing 
them up:  
 
1 1 1
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i im
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(5)
 
The cumulative intervention profits for BOJ are shown in panel E of Figure 3. 
If the exchange rate was depreciating when profitability rose, one might 
expect a central bank to feel comfortable about defending the currency. 
Conversely, in an appreciating scenario, it would sell the currency. This 
suggests that the estimated parameter for the effect of profitability should be 
negative. If positive, it would provide evidence that the central bank 
sometimes behaves like any other dealer in the foreign exchange market. 
 
 
The resulting intervention function is as below. 
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(6)
where 
 
=tdevI ,  An indicator variable that takes the value of positive (negative) one if ERDEVt  is positive (negative) and 
zero otherwise. If positive, the Yen is on a down-trend 
and is depreciating against the USD.  
,ERsize tI =  An indicator variable that takes the value of positive 
(negative) one if ERDEVt  is positive (negative) and by 
more than 5%, and zero otherwise. 
=tdsI ,  An indicator variable that takes the value of positive (negative) one if the daily exchange rate change (∆ERt) 
is positive (negative), and zero otherwise.  If positive, 
the Yen is depreciating against the USD. 
=thsizeI ,  An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the current conditional variance is higher than the 
unconditional (or average conditional) variance for 
each sample. 
,vmsize tI =  An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
trading volume on day t is higher than the sample 
average for each sample  
JP
ti∆ = Daily change of Japanese official discount rate. 
-1
US
ti∆ = Daily change of the US federal fund rate. 
CPROFITt 
= 
Conditional profits of intervention against the USD in 
domestic currency 
εt = Standard normal error 
 
The intervention function shown in (6) represents the BOJ’s desired 
intervention in the absence of fixed costs of intervention. Since we observe 
that there is zero intervention on most days (about 93% of days excluding 
weekends) and very few small interventions, it is reasonable to test for these 
fixed costs by considering upper and lower thresholds for intervention. 
Labeling these threshold values as θ+ and θ-, actual positive intervention will 
take place if the expected value of the intervention function in (6) is greater 
than θ+, and negative intervention if the value is less than θ-. Otherwise 
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actual intervention is zero.  This threshold model, which is called a friction 
model due to the fixed costs, can be estimated using quasi-maximum 
likelihood with the likelihood function given by: 
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where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function. 
 
5.6 Estimation Results for the Friction Model 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the friction model. The two sub-
samples as well as the full sample results are reported.  
The average effect of the exchange rate deviations on the 
intervention activities is negative and significant in all samples. This is what 
one expects if a ‘leaning against the wind’ type of intervention is at work. 
Evidently the BOJ reacted to overnight deviations from a short-term (150 
day) trend and stepped in to correct these. The magnitude of the coefficient 
in the second sub-sample is about 7 times that in the first. This reflects the 
larger magnitudes of intervention—the average intervention of was Yen 502 
billion  in sub-sample two compared to 47 billion in the first).  
In the full sample, these ‘leaning against the wind’ interventions 
were partially offset by the positive coefficient for above-normal deviations. 
This is consistent with the idea that when a deviation is of a particularly large 
magnitude, the central bank becomes less sure that it is seeing a random 
disturbance or that it has the resources to combat the disturbance. However, 
the overall effect of exchange rate deviations remained consistent with a 
‘leaning against the wind’ motive for intervention. When we examine the 
two sub-samples, the size effect was significant in the first only, and halved 
the response of the BOJ. These results support our rationale for a structural 
break in mid-1995. 
Exchange rate volatility had a significant negative influence on 
intervention in the full sample and in sub-sample one. This indicates that a 
combination of a Yen depreciation (in excess of the short-term trend) and a 
high conditional volatility encouraged BOJ purchases of Yen. There were no 
significant size dummy effects on conditional variance. We found no 
volatility effects in the second sub-sample. This might suggest that the BOJ 
was not concerned with the general state of the foreign exchange market. 
However the next result that we report suggests otherwise. 
Unexpected trading volume had a significant negative effect on 
intervention only in sub-sample two. This result lends support to a ‘leaning 
against the wind’ stance. If the traded volume was unexpectedly large on a 
day of a depreciating Yen, the BOJ purchased Yen. This was partially offset 
by the positive size dummy coefficient, which was marginally significant 
(at .08). This implies that trend-correcting interventions were seen to be less 
productive on the days of especially high volume, and so the BOJ backed off 
the foreign exchange market.   
The Japanese interest rate changes had a significant negative effect 
on BOJ intervention in the second sub-sample only. The negative coefficient 
indicates that a rise in the rate led to a USD sale (Yen purchase), which 
suggests that BOJ interventions were used in support of the domestic 
objectives of Japanese monetary policy. The magnitude of the coefficient, 
suggests a Yen 5.569 trillion sale of Yen in response to a one percentage 
point cut in the Japanese discount rate. This large value is not surprising due 
to the combination of the very large magnitudes of interventions (average of 
Yen502 billion) and very low discount rates (0.5% for the most of sub-
sample two). In short, changes in the official interest rate were supplemented 
by large BOJ interventions in the direction of the desired exchange rate 
movements. 
US interest rate changes were marginally significant (at 0.08) only in 
the first sub-sample. The positive coefficient suggests an intervention 
purchase of USD (sale of Yen) in response to a rise in the US Federal funds 
rate—thus this intervention was governed, as conjectured, by the objectives 
of Japanese monetary policy. A one percentage point (100 basis points) rise 
in the US interest rate led to a Yen 18.6 billion sale by the BOJ. This is a 
small response compared to that in the second sub-sample in response to the 
Japanese interest rate. It does imply that the BOJ acted on foreign exchange 
markets (but not in domestic asset markets) to try to depreciate the exchange 
rate, thus amplifying the desired effects of the tightening US monetary policy 
stance. 
The cumulative profits from interventions are shown to be positive 
and significant in the full sample and in sub-sample two. The positive sign 
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indicates an intervention sale of Yen when a higher profit is associated with a 
Yen depreciation. This might suggest that the BOJ acted like any other 
profit-driven dealer that reduces its exposure to a weakening asset. As its 
profitability rose, the BOJ was encouraged to use intervention more for its 
monetary policy objectives than for the purpose of stabilizing the foreign 
exchange market. 
Both the negative and positive thresholds are significant in all three 
samples. They are considerably larger in magnitude in the second sub-sample 
(approximately 30 times the size) compared to the first. This suggests that 
the BOJ practiced more restraint in the later sub-sample only coming into the 
market when a significantly higher threshold was breached on either side. 
Not only were the less frequent interventions considerably larger in size in 
sub-sample two, the estimated error variance was seventeen times larger. 
In short, our evidence suggests that BOJ interventions were 
motivated by both a desire to correct market disorderliness—via exchange 
rate deviations from short-term trends, higher volatilities (in sub-sample one 
only) and higher volume (in sub-sample two)—and to help achieve monetary 
policy objectives.  
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The BOJ’s intervention activities in the Yen/USD foreign exchange market 
have been investigated in this paper. We found that the change of 
intervention philosophy by the BOJ around July 1995 resulted in successful 
market responses to its intervention transactions.  
Before 1995, BOJ interventions were small and frequent and the 
contemporaneous daily movements of the Yen/USD exchange rate in 
response to intervention transactions were in the wrong direction 
(intervention purchases of the Yen depreciated it). However, the desired 
effect occurred on days with both large denomination interventions and those 
reinforced by the US Fed. The positive effect of these small unilateral 
interventions does not necessarily mean that these interventions were 
counter-productive, but it adds to the agnosticism about the desirability of 
intervention. The effects on trade volumes were similar—volume was 
successfully calmed only on unusual days of large, sustained and coordinated 
intervention.  
After 1995, interventions were less frequent and substantially larger 
in size. In contrast to results widely obtained in the literature, the 
contemporaneous effects of these large interventions were to move the 
exchange rate in the desired direction. The US Fed again added to the 
effectiveness of the BOJ interventions. The contemporaneous effect on the 
conditional volatility of the exchange rate was positive in both sub-samples, 
suggesting a higher volatility was associated with interventions. However, an 
offsetting influence was found on the days of cumulative interventions in the 
first sub-sample, and the US Fed interventions had market calming effects in 
sub-sample two.  In this period, intervention had no significant effect on 
volume levels, but it did significantly exacerbate the conditional variance of 
volumes. Overall our results suggest that while small interventions could be 
destabilizing, large, sustained and coordinated interventions work. 
The BOJ interventions were motivated by short-term trend-
correction in both sub-samples, and there is evidence that on days of 
persistent deviations the BOJ stayed out of the market in the first sub-sample. 
Higher conditional volatility or volume also elicited ‘leaning against the 
wind’ interventions. In general, the BOJ seemed to have consistently 
responded to correct short-term disorderliness.  
Finally, after mid-1995, BOJ intervention responded significantly to 
changes in the Japanese interest rate—a reduction in the rate was 
accompanied by sales of Yen. Thus, with interest rates approaching zero, the 
BOJ used foreign exchange intervention in support of the objectives of its 
monetary policy. We are thus able to conclude that the BOJ’s intense 
interventions post-1995 had significant desirable effects on the foreign 
exchange market, and these successful actions were in part motivated by 
domestic monetary policy objectives.  
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APPENDIX 
 
00:00 GMT, t-1 00:00 GMT, t
Open, t-1 Close, t-1 Open, t Close, t
07:00 JST 17:00 JST 07:00 JST 17:00 JST
Open, t-1 12:00 ET Close, t-1 Open, t 12:00 ET Close, t
07:00 ET 17:00 GMT 18:00 ET 07:00 ET 17:00 GMT 18:00 ET
∆ ER t-1 ∆ ER t
FX Volume, t-1 FX Volume, t
US Market:
Figure 1: Market Opening Hours of the Tokyo and New York Foreign Exchange Markets
Japanese:
GMT:
 Market   
BOJ 
Intervention
FED 
Intervention
 
  21
Figure 2: Yen/USD exchange rate, trade volume and Yen interventions 
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Figure 3: Determinants of Interventions 
A: Spot Exchange Rate: Deviations from 150 day moving average
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Summary Statistics
Mean -0.005 -0.150 -0.041 -0.727 0.019 0.421
Variance 0.51 16.40 0.41 15.64 0.57 16.78
Skewness -0.64 2.32 -0.45 3.98 -0.74 1.25
Excess Kurtosis 5.15 15.87 3.46 37.55 5.35 3.96
J-B Normality 3409 33083 620 71513 2354 1674
Tests of iid(1)
Q(20) 22.5 ** 2852.9 ** 34.2 ** 1655.2 ** 32.7 ** 2004.1 **
{0.01} {0.00} {0.02} {0.00} {0.04} {0.00}
Q2(20) 383 *** 419 *** 101 *** 204 *** 340 *** 207 ***
{0.00} {0.00} {0.00} {0.00} {0.00} {0.00}
Qb(10) : χ2(40) 5495 *** *** 1181 *** *** 2528 *** ***
{0.00} {0.00} {0.00}
Qb(10) : χ2(40) 2234.25 *** *** 272.02 *** *** 979.87 *** ***
{0.00} {0.00} {0.00}
Unit Root Tests(2)
ADF -53.5 -14.2 -53.0 -31.8 -53.0 -14.1
Granger Causality Tests
H0: ∆ER does not cause VM 4.95 7.03 16.68 ***
{0.42} {0.22} {0.01}
H0: VM does not cause ∆ER 16.93 *** 7.38 6.76
{0.00} {0.19} {0.24}
H0: (∆ER)2 does not cause VM 15.52 *** 12.67 ** 118.94 ***
{0.01} {0.03} {0.00}
H0: VM does not cause (∆ER)2 73.30 *** 6.56 15.46 ***
{0.00} {0.26} {0.01}
(1) Linear and non-linear (squares) Portmanteau test (Box-Ljung)
Bivariate portmanteau test of joint white noise is carried out as below:
where 
T  = no. of observations 
P  = no. of lags
     Q ~ χ2 with d.f.  = 4.P
(2) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with constant and trend and appropriate lags 
to render white noise innovations in the test equation. Lags used are 0 and 4 
for ∆ER and VM, respectively. Test statistic at 5% is -3.41.
Det-VM Det-VM Det-VM∆ER ∆ER ∆ER
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Yen/USD returns and Detrended Volume of Tokyo Market
Full Sample:
13 May 1991
to
28 Jun 2002
Sub-sample 1: Sub-sample 2:
13 Jan 1991 
to
 20 Jun 1995
21 Jun 1995
to
28 Jun 2002
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BOJ FED
Full Sample: Sub-sample 1: Sub-sample 2: Full Sample: Sub-sample 1: Sub-sample 2:
13 May 1991
to
28 Jun 2002
13 Jan 1991 
to
 20 Jun 1995
21 Jun 1995
to
28 Jun 2002
13 May 1991
to
28 Jun 2002
13 Jan 1991 
to
 20 Jun 1995
21 Jun 1995
to
28 Jun 2002
Number of days of Interventions
Positive 180 139 41 18 15 3
Negative 33 27 6 4 3 1
Total 213 166 47 22 18 4
Unilateral BOJ Interventions 191 148 43
Co-ordinated interventions 22 18 4
Average Size of Intervention (in Yen bn)
Positive 149.9 50.2 488.0 39.3 40.3 34.4
Negative -148.3 -29.2 -684.4 -35.0 -8.5 -114.6
Total (average of absolute values) 149.1 46.8 513.1 37.2 38.5 54.5
Largest Intervention (in in Yen bn)
Positive 1405.9 338.8 1405.9 77.5 77.5 45.4
Negative -2620.1 -76.9 -2620.1 -114.6 -12.7
Smallest Intervention (in in Yen bn)
Positive 5.1 5.1 43 16.9 16.9 28.9
Negative -3.2 -3.2 -76.4 -6.4 -6.4
Cumulative Intervention Probabilities
Prb(BOJ-It≠0 | BOJ-It-1≠0) 0.53 0.61 0.26
Prb(BOJ-It≠0 | BOJ-It-1≠0 & BOJ-It-2≠0 ) 0.34 0.42 0.09
Prb(FED-It≠0 | BOJ-It≠0) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 2: Intervention Statistics
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Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value
∆ER Detr-VM
ac αc -0.028 ** {0.04} 1.699 *** {0.00} 0.177 *** {0.00} 4.764 *** {0.00} -0.051 ** {0.01} 1.633 *** {0.00}
αvmer 0.976 *** {0.00} 0.980 *** {0.00} 0.925 *** {0.00}
aerma αerma -0.046 ** {0.01} 1.998 *** {0.00} -0.054 ** {0.01} 2.019 *** {0.00} -0.033 * {0.08} 2.466 *** {0.00}
avmma αvmma 0.001 {0.81} -0.711 *** {0.00} 0.003 * {0.09} -0.644 *** {0.00} 0.002 {0.65} -0.682 *** {0.00}
aerh αerh -0.044 {0.12} -3.223 *** {0.00} -0.321 *** {0.00} -8.241 *** {0.00} -0.044 ** {0.04} -3.016 *** {0.00}
avmh αvmh 0.011 {0.23} -0.030 {0.50} 0.002 {0.17} 0.029 {0.41} 0.006 {0.20} -0.180 *** {0.00}
ahol αhol 0.009 * {0.08} -0.235 *** {0.00} -0.021 * {0.06} -0.615 *** {0.00} 0.023 ** {0.01} -0.190 *** {0.00}
aidiff αidiff 0.011 *** {0.00} -0.004 {0.55} 0.013 *** {0.00}
aintv αintv -0.367 *** {0.00} 2.393 *** {0.00} -0.542 *** {0.00} 8.342 *** {0.00} 0.153 *** {0.00} 0.545 *** {0.00}
acum αcum -0.091 {0.12} -0.675 *** {0.00} 0.425 ** {0.02} -2.952 *** {0.00} -0.142 *** {0.00} -0.667 {0.36}
asize αsize 0.426 *** {0.00} -1.822 *** {0.00} 0.089 {0.59} -2.574 *** {0.00} -0.125 *** {0.00} -0.104 {0.59}
afed αfed 1.260 *** {0.00} -1.773 {0.31} 1.658 *** {0.00} -0.141 {0.94} 6.693 *** {0.00} 12.885 ** {0.04}
bc βc -0.208 *** {0.00} 0.565 *** {0.00} -0.467 *** {0.00} 0.594 *** {0.00} -0.140 *** {0.00} 0.587 *** {0.00}
bh βh 0.880 *** {0.00} 0.765 *** {0.00} 0.659 *** {0.00} 0.678 *** {0.00} 0.887 *** {0.00} 0.760 *** {0.00}
bε_er1 βε_er1 -0.040 *** {0.00} 0.036 *** {0.00} 0.000 {1.00} 0.002 {0.92} -0.077 *** {0.00} 0.055 *** {0.00}
bε_er2 βε_er2 0.209 *** {0.00} 0.314 *** {0.00} 0.215 *** {0.00} 0.342 *** {0.00} 0.215 *** {0.00} 0.202 *** {0.00}
bε_vm1 βε_vm1 0.059 *** {0.00} -0.003 {0.83} 0.062 *** {0.00} 0.007 {0.83} 0.040 ** {0.02} -0.046 ** {0.05}
bε_vm2 βε_vm2 -0.083 *** {0.00} 0.248 *** {0.00} -0.130 *** {0.00} -0.001 {0.99} -0.056 * {0.06} 0.312 *** {0.00}
bhol βhol 0.070 * {0.09} -0.085 *** {0.00} 0.042 {0.42} -0.124 ** {0.03} 0.045 {0.22} -0.063 *** {0.00}
bintv βintv 0.303 *** {0.00} 0.168 *** {0.00} 0.826 *** {0.00} 1.517 *** {0.00} 0.026 {0.17} 0.164 *** {0.00}
bcum βcum -0.007 {0.88} -0.175 ** {0.04} -0.424 *** {0.00} -0.292 * {0.09} 0.111 {0.32} -0.171 {0.12}
bsize βsize -0.294 *** {0.00} 0.014 {0.77} -0.108 {0.58} -0.946 *** {0.00} -0.029 {0.34} 0.010 {0.52}
bfed βfed -0.310 * {0.06} 0.638 {0.33} 0.545 {0.10} -2.869 *** {0.00} -0.900 *** {0.00} 3.683 *** {0.00}
ρ -0.049 *** {0.01} -0.073 ** {0.02} -0.025 {0.33}
d 34 *** {0.00} 18 *** {0.00} 83435 *** {0.00}
lnL -10188 -3591 -6416
Qb(10) : χ2(40) 53 * {0.08} 37 {0.59} 66 *** {0.01}
Q2b(10): χ2(40) 11 {1.00} 18 {1.00} 44 {0.30}
∆ER Detr-VM
Table 3: Bivariate-EGARCH(1,1)-t Model Estimations of Intervention Effectiveness
Full Sample: 
13 May 1991 - 28 Jun 2002
Sub-sample 1:
13 Jan 1991 - 20 Jun 1995
Sub-sample 2:
21 Jun 1995 - 28 Jun 2002
∆ER Detr-VM ∆ER Detr-VM
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αc -0.291 *** {0.00} -0.094 *** {0.00} -0.657 *** {0.00}
αERsize 0.092 ** {0.02} 0.047 *** {0.00} -0.138 {0.49}
βc -0.903 * {0.06} -0.264 ** {0.04} 1.549 {0.45}
βhsize 0.729 {0.22} 0.097 {0.58} -2.209 {0.34}
γc -0.123 {0.51} -0.060 {0.32} -2.332 *** {0.00}
γVMsize 0.092 {0.63} 0.071 {0.25} 1.371 * {0.08}
ψJP 0.551 {0.68} 0.176 {0.39} -55.69 ** {0.04}
ψUS 0.939 {0.13} 0.186 * {0.08} 1.917 {0.61}
φ 0.107 ** {0.02} 0.272 {0.11} 0.686 *** {0.00}
σ 4.592 *** {0.00} 0.795 *** {0.00} 13.607 *** {0.00}
θ+ 8.100 *** {0.00} 1.357 *** {0.00} 28.356 *** {0.00}
θ- -10.823 *** {0.00} -1.490 *** {0.00} -40.372 *** {0.00}
Log-L -1115 -472 -335
Table 4: Friction Model Estimations of BOJ's Intervention Reaction Function
Full sample: 
13 May 1991 - 
28 Jun 2002
Sub-sample one:
13 Jan 1991 - 
20 Jun 1995
Sub-sample two:
21 Jun 1995 - 
28 Jun 2002
 
 
 
